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1. Polish Question during the World War I 
Origins of independent state
The outbreak of World War I in 1914 indicated the end of a certain 
era. This epoch began with the fall of Napoleon I and the Vienna Congress 
of 1815. For many Europeans it was a period of development in different 
areas including economy, political freedoms, social security, science and 
technology. Despite mounting conflicts, social divisions and competition 
between superpowers this was a relatively stabile and peaceful period.
Not for Poles, though. They did not regard 19th century a “golden era”. 
Those were times of captivity and national disasters. Many Poles stopped 
to believe in armed uprising against partitioning powers and preferred to 
focus on social and economic development of the society. There were still 
some patriots, who recalled the words of famous Polish poet Adam Mic-
kiewicz (1798–1855) who had prayed for “a common war for freedom of 
peoples”.
The  Great War, however, was not a  fight for “freedom of peoples”, 
but undeniably resulted from a conflict of interest between superpowers. 
The fact that partitioning powers were on different sides of the barricade, 
namely Russia belonged to the  Entente Powers whereas Germany and 
the Austrian Empire were in the Central Powers bloc, was advantageous for 
the Polish cause and raised hopes for independence. The main problem lay 
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in the choice of an ally: which side should Poles back up to acquire most 
political gains.
It should be pointed out that partitioning powers did not have a clear 
concept on Polish cause, except for their intention to turn Polish lands into 
battleground for eastern front operations. Military circles of the fighting 
sides did their best to foster friendly attitude of the  civilian population. 
As early as August 1914 commands of German and Russian armies issued 
special manifestos to Polish nation, each army avoiding promises and dis-
seminating sheer propaganda. Germans reminded Poles of the Russian per-
secutions while Russians invoked the tradition of the Slavs fighting against 
Teutonic Knights.
Polish political elites had different attitude towards partitioning pow-
ers and different visions of action. The  best known leaders of opposing 
camps were Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski. Piłsudski who was a fol-
lower of uprising tradition perceived Russia as the enemy of Poland and 
tactically supported Central Powers. Dmowski, on the  other hand, was 
anti-German and believed to win Polish cause by co-operation with Russia 
and its Western Allies namely France and Great Britain.
In the  Austrian partition, known as Galicia, Piłsudski well before 
the war organised paramilitary formations that later gave rise to the Pol-
ish Legions, subordinated to Austrian orders. For two years the Legions 
fought with dedication. Piłsudski took command of the First Brigade of 
the Legions himself. Piłsudski’s charisma and skilful propaganda won him 
great popularity in the  society. The  legend of Piłsudski and his Legions 
partially came from the role Poles assigned to armed struggle and military 
commanders.
In 1915 a victorious German army occupied the area of Russian Parti-
tion and two zones of occupation were created on Polish lands. In German 
and Austrian Zones of Occupation Poles enjoyed certain range of freedoms, 
that were mainly given in the field of education and local government. In 
general, however, Poles were disappointed with the policy of the occupy-
ing powers that were economically exploiting the occupied area and were 
reluctant to take a decision on the future of Polish lands. Only on 5 No-
vember 1916 a famous Declaration was published. According to the will 
of the two emperors Poland was to become an independent constitutional 
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monarchy, but within so far undefined territorial and constitutional limits. 
The Declaration was a clear proof of German intention to create a buffer or 
satellite country and gain Polish recruitment. Therefore Polish nation were 
not satisfied with the Declaration. But on the other hand its objective im-
portance cannot be underestimated as it raised Polish question effectively 
on international level.
However, the key event for the Polish cause was the Russian Revolu-
tion of 1917. After the February Revolution and the overthrow of the Tsar 
the  Provisional Government proclaimed an independent Poland, yet in 
close military alliance with Russia. Polish military formations began to be 
created in Russia.
The policy of the Western Entente Powers towards Poland changed out 
of all recognition. Roman Dmowski, who had been campaigning for Polish 
cause in Western Europe for two years, had finally a chance to act effec-
tively. In August 1917 he founded the Polish National Committee (KNP) 
in Lausanne, Switzerland. The  KNP soon moved to Paris and the  gov-
ernments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy officially recognised 
it as the  sole and exclusive representation of Polish interests. The KNP’s 
great achievement was establishment of the Polish Army in France under 
the command of general Józef Haller, that joined the fighting on the West-
ern Front at the  last stage of the war and thus symbolised Poland active 
support for the winning coalition.
Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 was of great importance for 
Poland. Firstly, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and 
Lenin’s Russia signed in March 1918 excluded Russia from the victorious 
Entente powers. Secondly, the Western countries could not accept the new 
political system in Russia. Until the Revolution in Russia the western pow-
ers regarded the Polish question as an internal matter of their great Russian 
ally. After Bolsheviks’ success, however, the Entente politicians, especially 
the French, started to consider creation of independent states in Central 
and Eastern Europe an advantageous move as they could separate the West 
from “the red plague”.
The United States also showed sympathy for the Polish cause. The thir-
teenth of President Thomas Woodrow Wilson’s famous “Fourteen Points” 
on peace aims, spoke of an independent Poland with access to the sea.
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The defeat of the Central Powers and the Russian Revolution turned 
out to be a convenient coincidence Poles could not have dreamed of. Au-
tumn 1918 brought Poland freedom. Local authorities started to be estab-
lished. Poles disarmed German and Austrian garrisons. In the  night of 
6/7 November socialist leaders formed a Provisional Government in Lub-
lin. Józef Piłsudski, who after his refusal to compromise with Central Pow-
ers, had been imprisoned since summer 1917 in Magdeburg, Germany, 
returned to Warsaw on 10 November. On 11 November he took office as 
Commander-in-Chief and on 14 November as Chief-of-state, on the plea 
of the Regency Council, convoked by the occupying powers.
Most Europeans perceived World War I as tragic nightmare, depicted 
in books by Erich Remarque, Siegfried Sassoon or Ernest Hemingway. For 
Poles, however, it was the war that brought them independence. 11 No-
vember, the day of the Western Armistice, a bank holiday when most peo-
ple commemorate soldiers killed during the war, in Poland is celebrated as 
Independence Day. It should not be forgotten, however, that the war was 
also tragic for Poles. Not only did they have ranks in all the  combatant 
armies, but their country was badly destroyed and as the result of the war 
many Polish soldiers and civilians were scattered all over the world.
2. Struggle for territory and frontiers
Some historians, e.g. Norman Davis, perceive the events of November 
1918 as a “miracle” and describe actions of the Polish population as large-
ly irrelevant in gaining independence. One should not forget that Poland 
regained independence after 123 years, its frontiers were not defined and 
sovereignty of the new state was fragile. Throughout the coming three years 
Poles were to establish the frontiers of their country as well as defend and 
preserve independence. They fought a series of wars concurrently including 
fierce Ukrainian and Soviet Wars and Minor conflicts with Czechoslovakia 
and Lithuania. Polish population in Posnania and Upper Silesia prosecut-
ed war with Germany through Risings, secretly supported by  the Polish 
government. Polish struggle for frontiers was an amazing achievement and 
perhaps the greatest success of inter-war Poland.
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Piłsudski and Dmowski’s political camps differed in their concept of 
frontiers and internal organisation of the state. Piłsudski and his supporters 
thought of establishing a new Central European order that could effectively 
resist the expansion of Russia both White and Red. The key to success was 
to be Polish-Lithuanian Federation closely connected with independent 
Ukraine with a military alliance. Some expressed opinion that with mo-
dern slogans of sovereignty of nations Piłsudski wanted to ensure Poland 
a dominating role in the region and restore the powerful position Poland 
enjoyed before partitions.
Dmowski strongly opposed this concept. He was a declared nationalist 
and wanted a centralised, uniform country conducting assimilation policy 
towards Slavic Minorities. He was ready to give up a part of former Polish 
Eastern lands but wanted Poland to gain more land on the West. In his 
opinion Poland’s role was to resist German expansion.
Despite different points of view, both Piłsudski and Dmowski dreamed 
of powerful Poland. They both overestimated chances for its creation and 
at the  same time underestimated national aspirations of Ukrainians and 
Lithuanians.
The struggle for frontiers required great effort on the part of Polish so-
ciety. The increase of the army was impressive. In November 1918 Poland 
had an estimated 6 thousand soldiers, in January 1919 the number reached 
110 thousand and half year later around 600 thousand! It is worth stressing 
that a large part of the army was made up of volunteers.
The greatest challenge for the infant Republic was the war with Soviet 
Russia. The conflict was inevitable. Bolsheviks had no intention of resigning 
from the areas of the former Tsarist Empire and planned to “export” revolu-
tion to the West. On the other hand Piłsudski dreamed of ultimate separa-
tion of Russia from Europe and uniting non-Russian nations with Poland.
Military operations lasted nearly two years from the end of 1918 till 
autumn of 1920. The fortune of the war was very various. In 1919 the ini-
tiative lay with the Polish army that captured Wilno and Minsk. Yet in Oc-
tober Piłsudski, Commander-in-Chief, decided to halt military campaign 
partly because he was reluctant to provide aid to anti-Bolshevik forces and 
partly due to the exhaustion of Polish soldiers. Piłsudski knew that “white” 
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Russian generals were more hostile towards Poland then Bolsheviks. At 
the same time the “white” Russia got the support of the West. Some au-
thors exaggerate claiming that Piłsudski’s decisions helped Bolsheviks win 
the counterrevolution and stay in power.
In 1920, the action expended dramatically. In April Poles launched an 
offensive in order to recapture Ukrainian lands from Russia as Ukraine played 
an important role in Piłsudski’s geopolitical concept. Piłsudski got the sup-
port of Symen Petliura, one of the few significant Ukrainian politicians willing 
to co-operate with Poland. Only after 12-day march Polish army took Kiev. 
But a Soviet counteroffensive in the north turned to be disastrous for Poland. 
In August the Red Army under the 27-year-old Mikhail Tukhachevsky, were 
approaching the suburbs of Warsaw. In the occupied territory power was in 
hands of Provisional Revolutionary Committee that was to become a govern-
ment of “red” Poland after a victory Soviets expected.
Despite strong support of France (Polish army had French advisers, 
Charles de Gaulle among them), opinion in Western Europe was not fa-
vourable. Communist propaganda campaign under the slogan “Hands of 
Russia” proved successful and many people who were not dedicated com-
munists believed that Russia conducted a just war. Foreign military assis-
tance for Poland was blocked in Germany and Czechoslovakia.
For fear of loosing only just regained independence the  society got 
mobilised and integrated. Even boys under the age of 18 joined the army 
as volunteers. The all-party Government for National Defence led by Win-
centy Witos was founded.
The turning point was the Battle of Warsaw fought in the middle of 
August 1920. Poles called it a  “miracle of the Vistula”. A  well-prepared 
military plan brought Polish army overwhelming victory and defeated So-
viet army was forced to retreat. Lord D’Abernon, the  British Ambassa-
dor at Berlin, called the battle “the eighteenth decisive battle of the world” 
and compared it to the victory over Arabs at the Battle of Tours in 732 
by Charles Martel.
Both sides were exhausted and in October signed the  armistice. In 
the capital of Latvia, in March 1921 the Treaty of Riga was made. It es-
tablished the  Polish – Soviet borderline that remained unchanged until 
the Soviet attack in September 1939.
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Poland defended its independence and blocked Bolshevik advance to 
the West that was very dangerous for Europe given the revolutionary tur-
moil in Germany at that time. However, Piłsudski was not successful with 
his plan for Central and Eastern Europe. Though regarded as the  main 
author of the military victory his opponents pointed to his unrealistic in-
tentions that brought Poland to the verge of crisis.
While the eastern frontier was set up by military operations the west-
ern border was to be decided by politicians at Paris Peace Conference that 
established new order in Europe. The Chief Polish Delegates were Roman 
Dmowski and Ignacy Paderewski – Prime Minister, a pianist and a well-
known composer.
Poles were a bit disappointed with the peace treaty signed in Versailles 
on 28 June 1919. Poland gained almost whole Posnania (due to success-
ful Polish Risings in 1918 and 1919) and West Prussia at the Baltic Sea. 
However, an important port city of Danzig (Gdańsk) was made Free City 
of Danzig under the League of Nations. In Upper Silesia, East Prussia and 
Mazuria plebiscites were to be held. Poland was also to accept a Minority 
treaty that provided for the right of the League of Nations to control na-
tional Minorities in newly established states. And so German Minority in 
Poland was under the League protection whereas Polish Minority in Ger-
many was not.
Poland lost plebiscites in East Prussia and Mazuria. Surprisingly 
enough, Poland also failed in Upper Silesia where Polish community was 
quite strong. In the voting that took place in March 1921, 479,000 voters 
opted for Poland and 708,000 for Germany. However, 200 thousand votes 
might have been cast by Germans born but not residing in Silesia.
Poles decided to organise the third rising as an “argument signed in 
blood”. Although fierce fighting in May and June 1921 did not bring a mil-
itary solution, it exerted influence on the Allied Powers and the League of 
Nations and eventually Upper Silesia was divided along new lines. Only 
twenty-nine per cent of the  total plebiscite area was granted to Poland. 
It was the most industrialised and the most densely populated part, though. 
It was passed into Poland in June 1922 and this event May symbolise 
the end of Polish struggle for territory and frontiers.
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3. The Second republic. Territory and society
When the borders were fixed Poland had a territory of 388,6 thousand 
sq. km. and in 1938 after the occupation of the Zaolzie, a  conflict area 
with Czechoslovakia, Polish territory extended to 389,7 thousand sq. km 
(now its total area is 312,7 sq. km), that gave Poland 6th place in Europe 
after the USSR, France, Spain, Germany and Sweden. The borderline was 
5534 km long and Poland was bordered with Germany, the USSR, Lith-
uania, Latvia, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The country was divided into 
16  voivodships (see: map “Poland 1918–1939”).
In 1921 Poland had an estimated 27,2 million inhabitants and in 
1939 their number amounted to 35 million. The largest cities were War-
saw, Łódź, Kraków, Poznań, Wilno (now the  capital of Lithuania) and 
Lvov (now in Ukraine). Poland was a multinational country and one third 
of the  total population constituted national Minorities with Ukrainians 
15–16%, Jews 8–10%, Byelorussians 4–6% and Germans 2–3%. It was 
generally considered that successive Polish governments failed to devel-
op a  sensible Minority policy that would limit national conflicts. It was 
a complex problem since a lot of Poles were devoted to Polish nationalism 
whereas many organisations of national Minorities declared their hostility 
toward Poland and were reluctant to compromise. For instance Ukrainian 
nationalists for many years pursued terrorist activities in south-eastern Bor-
derlands.
Inter-war Poland was an agricultural and underdeveloped country. In-
tegration of the three formerly partitioned areas that differed economically 
(as well as had different administrations and legal codes) and had been 
closely lined with economies of the  partitioning powers was the  largest 
problem to overcome. The area of Prussian Partition was the best devel-
oped. The situation in the  former Kingdom of Poland was not bad, but 
the rest of former Russian Partition and a large part of Austrian Partition 
were very underdeveloped and it is not an exaggeration to say that in rural 
areas people lived in severe poverty and misery.
Independent Poland was facing economic problems. Severe war destruc-
tion not only by military operations but also intentional activity of the armies 
that had trundled through Polish lands only added to the problem.
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The  structure of the  Polish society displayed certain characteristic 
features. It was a  rural society as peasants made up more than a half of 
the  population (75% Poles lived in the  countryside). The  social groups 
responsible for economic development in the West namely bourgeoisie and 
higher middle class were rather weak in Poland. It was a result of economic 
regression and harmful impairment of burgher estate that had already last-
ed for many centuries. A significant proportion of the bourgeoisie ranging 
from poor shop owners and craftsmen to entrepreneurs were Jewish and to 
a lesser extent German. Nationalists used this fact for the purpose of their 
propaganda that unfortunately many Poles attentively followed.
Office workers called intelligentsia that made up 5–6% was a special 
group in Polish society. It included people with higher (only 11% of office 
workers) and secondary education as well as unqualified clerks. Therefore 
prestige the intelligentsia enjoyed was not an effect of the respect for educa-
tion but was rather attributed to high praise of office work, even unproduc-
tive, that the society considered to be a pass to “the better kind of people”.
Another prestigious social group were landowners deriving from 
the noble estate i.e. possessonati. Anachronous as their social function may 
seem, landowners were the ones to promote civilisation development in 
Polish backward agriculture.
A  compulsory education for children aged 7–14 began to function 
in the first few months of independence. However resources were scarce. 
There was a lack of both schools and teachers. In more backward rural ar-
eas the scope of mandatory education was reduced and children attended 
school only up to the third or fourth grades. Despite all these difficulties an 
immense progress was made in the sphere of primary education. In 1921 
33 per cent of the population were illiterate whereas 10 years later illiteracy 
rate was reduced to 23 per cent and at the outbreak of The World War II 
it came to the  level of approximately 15%. Only a  small proportion of 
young people could afford secondary or higher education, but still peasant 
youngsters were more eager to obtain higher education in inter-war Po-
land then those in communist Poland when education was free! Secondary 
and higher education was on very high level and main cities as Warsaw, 
Cracow, Vilnius, Poznań and Lublin had their universities. Interestingly 
enough there was no university in Łódź, which was the second biggest city 
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in Poland. Despite financial problems Polish science was successful in many 
fields such as mathematics, physics, chemistry and technical science and 
achieved the highest world level.
4. Right and left wings. Politics in inter-war Poland
Political life in inter-war Poland was very eventful not only due to 
numerous political parties but also their frequent divisions. The most im-
portant political camps included national, Christian democratic, peasant, 
socialist and Piłsudski’s camp.
4.1. National Democrats
The strongest party in the first years of independence was the National 
Democracy (Endecja). Its programme was based on nationalist ideology 
formulated by Roman Dmowski and his associates at the turn of the cen-
tury. The movement activists perceived nation as the most important value 
and political category. They were reluctant to grant concessions to national 
Minorities and exhibited strong anti-Semitic and anti-German attitudes. 
The  role of religion and Roman-Catholic church was emphasised. Na-
tionalists looked for close relations with France and proper relations with 
the USSR. Later they led to the  rise of radical and anti-democratic na-
tionalist organisations such as the Camp of Great Poland (in 1926) and 
National and Radical Camp (1934). Their activists organised numerous 
anti-Semitic incidents, especially in the 30s.
The  greatest nationalists were Roman Dmowski, Stanisław Grabski, 
Stanisław Głąbiński and Marian Seyda.
4.2. Christian Democrats
The  ideology of Christian Democratic parties derived from with 
the social teaching of the Roman-Catholic Church but they did not exert 
much influence on Polish politics since Catholics in Poland were circled 
around National Democracy. In 1937 main parties of Christian Democrats 
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(called Chadecja) created Labour Movement. The most outstanding activist 
of Christian Democracy was Wojciech Korfanty, the leader of fighting for 
Upper Silesia.
4.3. Peasant movement
Given the structure of society the peasant movement played a signif-
icant role on the political map of Poland. However, a big number of peas-
ant parties hindered its influence. Only in 1931 did the  most powerful 
parties create the Peasant Party. In the 1930s its programme was based on 
the Agrarian Idea formulated in Germany in the second half of 19th cen-
tury. According to this doctrine agriculture was the key sector of economy 
and peasants the most important and valuable social group. The most out-
standing leaders of the peasant movement were Wincenty Witos, three times 
Prime Minister and Maciej Rataj, Sejm Speaker.
4.4. Socialist movement
The Polish Socialist Party was founded in 1919 after a merger of so-
cialist organisations from the three partitions. Shortly after Poland regained 
independence socialists insisted on establishing broad social legislation 
(e.g.  it provided for eight-hour working day) that put Poland ahead of 
other European countries. Socialists strongly supported parliamentary de-
mocracy. In 1926 the party gave open support to Piłsudski’s coup d’etat 
who was their former leader. But dissapointed socialists soon moved to 
the opposition against Piłsudski’s camp. The party was an active member 
of Labour and Socialist International (continuation of the Second Interna-
tional). Leading party activists included Ignacy Daszyński, Feliks Perl and 
Mieczysław Niedziałkowski.
4.5. Communists
Communist party in Poland was weaker than in neighbouring and 
western countries. Communists were persecuted because they did not recog-
nise independent Poland considering it “bourgeoisie”. They also questioned 
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Polish ownership of Eastern territory. Majority of Poles perceived commu-
nists as Soviet spies. In 1938 Stalin ordered to dissolve the Communist 
Party of Poland and its greatest activists were murdered in Soviet prisons. 
The party leaders were Maria Koszutska, Maksymilian Horwitz-Walecki and 
Adolf Warski.
4.6. Józef Piłsudski’s camp
It was the most unusual political formation of all. At first Piłsudski’s 
supporters did not constitute a political organisation but tried to exert in-
fluence in various parties, social organisations and in the army. They set up 
their own Non-Party Block for Co-operation with Government (BBWR) 
in 1928 when Piłsudski was already in power after his coup d’etat. After 
Piłsudski’s death BBWR was replaced by Camp of National Unity concen-
trated around Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, army commander and Piłsud-
ski’s successor.
Piłsudski and his followers believed the state is the greatest value. They 
were fiercely critical of political parties and parliamentary system and glo-
rified authoritarian regime. They claimed aversion to ideology and believed 
in interparty co-operation for the well-being of the state.
4.7. Transformations of political system
In 19th century Poland was erased from the map while many Europe-
an countries were developing modern forms of political life and political 
culture. After the World War I Poles had to start building their democracy 
from the scratch.
The first parliamentary elections were held in January 1919. It is worth 
to stress that women were granted full voting rights, and in this respect 
Poland was ahead of such countries as France and Great Britain where de-
mocracy had been already long established. The main task a unicameral 
parliament, traditionally called Sejm, took on was to draft a constitution. 
The constitution was proclaimed on 17 March 1921 and is known as March 
Constitution. It was one of the most democratic constitutions at that time.
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The  march Constitution provided for the  organs of the  nation: in 
the domain of legislative power it was a bicameral parliament made up of 
Sejm and Senate and in the domain of executive power the government 
and the president. The tenure of parliament was 5 years and president was 
elected for 7 years. The constitution provisions guaranteed Poland a very 
strong and influential parliament and comparatively weak executive power 
with considerably reduced competencies of the president that were relative-
ly small if compared with other democratic countries such as Germany or 
Czechoslovakia. Many experts consider the imbalance between legislative 
and executive power the basic defect of the constitution.
What were the main weaknesses of Polish political life in the first years 
of independence? The  country was rife with numerous political parties, 
fiercely fighting each other. This in turn made it hard to form a stable Ma-
jority that could establish a  reliable government. In the  period between 
November 1918 and May 1926 Poland had 13 governments, one remained 
in office only 9 days. The longest working government was under Prime 
Minister Władysław Grabski, a  reformer of Polish economy and survived 
nearly 2 years.
Political conflicts became highly confrontational. In December 1922 
professor Gabriel Narutowicz, an outstanding scholar, was elected the first 
Polish constitutional President. This moderate politician, was a candidate 
of the centre and left wing, supported by the national Minorities. The dis-
appointed right wing unleashed a violent campaign against the President. 
Street riots broke out and opposition hurled insults at the  President. 
A  week after his appointment Narutowicz was assassinated by  a  fanatic 
nationalist. Poland was at the verge of civil war but tensions got resolved.
Piłsudski, a charismatic politician and Chief of State in 1918–1922, 
posed a serious political problem. During a few years spent on the political 
sidelines he protested against the democratic system which he himself had 
initiated. He took particular offence at the performance of political parties 
arguing that they did not act in the interest of the state but for private bene-
fits of their members. He also claimed that Polish political elites are demor-
alised and incompetent. Piłsudski’s supporters attempted to convince Poles 
that he should return power in order to make Poland strong and secure.
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Polish young democracy came in for far too fierce criticism that was 
more and more popular in the society. One should bear in mind that Eu-
rope was in the grip of crisis and parliamentary systems were considered to 
become outdated.
In May 1926 Piłsudski staged an armed coup d’etat supported 
by  the  left wing, progressives, liberals and communists. Piłsudski set up 
a weird political system. It was not a typical dictatorship, as the parliament 
was not dissolved. Formally the constitutional order was prolonged, but in 
reality Piłsudski took control of political affairs and made decisions himself. 
In fact ministers of consecutive governments were appointed by Piłsudski 
and his people, not by the parliament. And thus one of the most important 
elements of parliamentary democracy seized to function and power lay in 
the hands of narrow group of people.
Officially Piłsudski was only head of the army. He was also the Prime 
Minister twice. Unlike other dictators he did not show interest in adminis-
trative matters, nor external splendours of power.
Piłsudski criticised and discredited the  parliament often in brutal 
language. He wanted an obedient Sejm of limited competencies. In late 
1920s opposition from the left wing and the centre jointed together and 
formed the inter-party alliance of the Centre-Left (Centrolew). They aimed 
at overthrowing Piłsudski. In September 1930 a group of parliamentary 
opponents were arrested and confined in the military prison at Brześć Lite-
wski. They were treated with brutality, many were bestially beaten. Later 
they were put on trial. Though they did not get harsh sentences, these 
remained the gloomiest events in Polish inter-war history.
Piłsudski’s subjugation of opposition symbolised the end of his “liber-
al” rule. In November 1930 his camp got the Majority vote in the parlia-
mentary elections by frauds and intimidation. Sick and strained Piłsudski 
limited his interest to foreign policy and commanding the army leaving rest 
of power in the hands of his co-workers called “Colonels”.
On 23 April 1935 a new constitution was signed. Piłsudski’s supporters 
employed unfair practices in order to approve the April Constitution whose 
provisions resembled their political views. It significantly reduced the pow-
ers of parliament to the  benefit of Presidential prerogatives. Practically 
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all organs were subordinated to the president as he could appoint the gov-
ernment and higher officials, summon and dissolve parliament as well as 
appoint his successor. It was assumed that the president was responsible 
only “before God and history”. The constitution did not provide much for 
civic rights.
Piłsudski died three weeks later on 12 May 1935. The political system 
after 1926 was based on his authority and the role he played and after his 
death conflicts between politicians from Piłsudski camp arose. Eventual-
ly President Ignacy Mościcki shared power with the  head of the  military 
Edward Rydz-Śmigły. Some ironically compared that system to Japanese 
shogunate.
5. Foreign policy. Problems and dilemmas
Two neighbours of inter-war Poland questioned decisions of the Trea-
ty of Versailles. Both for Germany and the  Soviet Union Poland was 
a “harmful fruit of Versailles”. Germans believed that Poles occupy their 
lands whereas the Soviet Union could not accept the fact that Poland hin-
dered their victorious march to the West.
In the 1920s and early 1930s relations between democratic Weimar 
Republic and the Soviet Union were good. In 1922 a pact in Rapello was 
signed and in 1926 in Berlin. The tow countries established intensive mili-
tary co-operation. This situation worried Polish military and political elites.
The counter-balance of Polish foreign policy rested in Polish-French 
alliance and in Poland’s alliance with Romania. France had traditionally 
been a friend of Poland. French society, however, threatened by atrocities 
of the World War I, were ready to make concessions to Germany. Great 
Britain willing to relax relations with Germany, exerted pressure on French 
government. France and Belgium were given safety from German invasion 
in 1925 at the conference in Locarno, Switzerland. The agreement did not 
include support for eastern French allies namely Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia. In fact European borders were divided into “better” western and 
“worse” eastern frontiers. Poles understood that Western countries were 
ready to accept German territorial revisionism.
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Undoubtedly bad relations with other neighbours added to the prob-
lem. Relations with Czechoslovakia could be described as not friendly and 
relations with Lithuania were very hostile and until 1938 the two countries 
did not maintain diplomatic relations as Lithuania laid claim to Wilno area 
that belonged to Poland. Only short borderlines with Romania and Latvia 
were unproblematic.
The achievements of Polish diplomacy in 1930s are the most contro-
versial and the hardest to assess in the history of the Second Republic. In 
1932 Józef Beck, a 38-year old, ambitious and dynamic Piłsudski’s associate 
was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Along with Piłsudski they de-
veloped the policy of “balanced relations” with Germany and the USSR. 
The concept was based on the assumption that only peaceful relations with 
the most dangerous neighbours would ensure Poland security. The archi-
tects of Polish foreign policy did not believe in efficiency of multilateral 
security systems or the League of Nations.
In 1932 the Treaty of Non-aggression was signed with the Soviet Un-
ion. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany and launched anti-Polish 
propaganda campaign. Polish leaders sought an agreement with Germany 
as they believed that Western countries were ready to sacrifice Polish West-
ern frontier. In January 1934 Poland signed a pact of non-aggression with 
Germany and Polish-German relations became as good as never before.
Polish policy towards Germany enraged France and caused antipathy 
of Western countries towards Poland, especially among left and liberal an-
ti-fascist circles. But it enabled Poland to gain a  few years of stability it 
needed.
Partnership relations with Germany were possible as long as the mili-
tary potential of the two countries was similar. But the situation changed. 
In the light of Hitler’s successes, his aggressive approach, restoration of Ger-
man military power, Western appeasement policy and Stalin’s play the poli-
cy of “balanced relations” turned to be inefficient.
Hot discussions continue to this day on errors of Polish diplomacy. 
Some historians believe that Polish politicians should not have followed 
the policy of balanced relations so closely when conditions changed. Others 
emphasise that establishing closer relations with Germany was too osten-
tatious and so Europe was further antagonised towards Poland. Moreover, 
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certain mistakes are said to be made in policy towards countries of Central 
Europe, mainly Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion is that 
Polish politicians did everything in their power to preserve independence.
German-Soviet agreement (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) signed on 
23 August 1939 was a death sentence on Poland. The fact that at the out-
break of World War  II Poland had political and military guarantees of 
France and Great Britain was an undoubted success of Polish diplomacy. 
Polish side was not to blame that Poland’s allies could not provide it with 
efficient assistance.
Some historians and political commentators believe that Poland 
should have accepted Hitler’s political and territorial demands and they 
provide examples of Central European satellite countries of the Third Reich 
i.e. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. They perceive Polish “No” as a  ro-
mantic but not clever move that cost Poland horrors of the World War II. 
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